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Abstract: 
 
A more conservative supreme court will likely have the chance to overrule Roe v. Wade. Many 
states have passed heartbeat laws that will probably be taken all the way to the supreme court, 
these cases will ask the supreme court to affirm fetal personhood, giving fetuses a 
constitutionally recognized right to due process and making abortion illegal. In this thesis, I will 
defend an expansion of protections for pregnant peoples through a socialized right to abortion.  
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Introduction 
 
Approximately, half of the world's population is capable of giving birth. At some point in 
the lives of billions of individuals, they will be faced with a decision to procreate, whether that 
choice is preventative birth control, abstinence, abortion, or other methods of reproductive 
control.1 In 1973, Roe v. Wade made abortion legal until the fetus was medically viable when the 
fetus could live outside the body of the pregnant person, with no interference on the part of the 
state.  With modern medical improvements, the common understanding of the viability timeline 
has shrunk to about 22 weeks. There is substantial controversy about what is required to define 
viability, is viability a 100% chance of life if extracted from the womb or merely a 25% chance?2 
Before the Supreme Court decided Roe, most people with uteruses had little to no access to 
abortion. Those who did have access often had to pay large sums of money for an illegal abortion 
performed in dangerous conditions or were able to work with a doctor to get an abortion for the 
‘health of the mother,' a common exception to the anti-abortion laws around the United States. 
Although Roe allowed for people with uteruses to get abortions with few state restrictions pre-
viability and with an increasing number of state restrictions post-viability, it did not guarantee 
access to doctors or clinics that would perform abortions. Accessibility is becoming a more 
significant issue as the anti-abortion movement sees successes in state governments to limit 
access to abortion. 
                                                 
1 This thesis will use gender-neutral language throughout to ensure that the language is non-
exclusionary to trans and intersex men and women along with gender fluid and non-binary 
individuals who are often left out of discussions of reproductive health. Many arguments exclude 
non-cisgendered people from discussions in abortion rights, as populations that are still affected 
by the regulation of uteruses, they should not be excluded through gendered language and 
omission in discussions on their rights and freedoms as individuals. 
2 The timeline for viability is under great discussion, for some discussions include Schneider and 
Vinovskis The Law and Politics of Abortion, Shaw and Doudera Defining Human Life, Roth 
Making Women Pay, and Schroedel Is the Fetus a Person? 
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Fetal personhood grew out of the anti-abortion movement. There are few if any prior 
cases in which the fetus was believed to be a person before exiting the womb. Historically, anti-
abortion laws were non-existent in most parts of the world, including in the United States, and 
when they did exist, the purpose was to protect pregnant persons from the dangers of pregnancy 
(Schroedel, 2000; Roth, 2000: Levit, Verchock, 2006). These laws evolved into fetal personhood 
primarily due to the impact of the Christian religion which began to define the soul as entering 
the fetus at conception, ensoulment, this concept emerged in the enlightenment era but was still 
not commonly used to argue against abortion rights until more recently. For some religious 
persons, ensoulment is the point in which personhood begins; therefore, after conception, the 
fetus is a person, and to abort the fetus would be to commit murder, a cardinal sin.3 Although 
abortion was not an exact medical science, it was understood to be an appropriate method for 
women to manage reproduction among many communities.  
Fetal personhood is the center of most anti-abortion argumentation. Anti-abortion 
arguments seek to reduce all access to abortion except when it is necessary to protect the health 
of the pregnant person. Even when exceptions are made for pregnancies resulting from rape or 
incest, fetal personhood gives the fetus claims to protection both under constitutional and state 
laws. The common sense response to fetal personhood is that the fetus's rights evolve as it moves 
from zygote to fetus to birth, increasing the rights of the fetus until it is viable. Many also 
demand to require pregnant people to ensure a specific quality of life for the fetus. This demand 
often lies on the shoulders of the pregnant person to give up ‘dangerous' behavior. The most 
                                                 
3 Before the viability debate, quickening was the preferred time to judge the legality of abortion. 
Quickening is the common term for the first time a pregnant person feels the movement of the 
fetus. Roe mentions the common law precedent for abortion regulation. The common law 
generally affirmed that before quickening abortion was not a crime, but after quickening it 
became a crime lesser than homicide.   
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politically popular regulations from both pro- and anti-abortion advocates is the jailing and 
punishment of drug-using pregnant people. The bipartisan attacks on drug-using pregnant people 
are the beginning of the infringement on rights that fetal personhood threatens.  
It is widely understood that the right to abortion is put at risk by the success of anti-
abortion coalitions in electing to office “pro-life” politicians and the restrictive policies they 
enact. More fundamentally, I will argue, the absence of reproductive freedom is, in part, the 
reluctance of “pro-choice” advocates to support a more radical understanding of the right to 
abortion. Feminist and pro-abortion advocates continue to give up substantial and significant 
ground to fetal personhood advocates, such as the maltreatment and punishment of drug-addicted 
pregnant people. The accepting of ‘common sense' regulation about fetuses threatens to allow for 
fetal personhood to take greater control of the legal system. To create clear advocacy that allows 
for the central focus on the pregnant person and their needs, I will present a socialized right to 
reproductive freedom. This right seeks to mitigate the effects of societal and economic harms on 
those who may become pregnant by analyzing the dangers and harms both the pregnant person 
and the fetus to ensure the quality of the potential life, without creating a more significant burden 
on those who may choose to carry life. This right to reproductive freedom draws on Marxist and 
feminist analysis on the conditions of society and pregnancy to create a list of required 
conditions to create reproductive freedom. Reproductive freedom includes, but is not limited to, 
access to food and nutrition, a stable job, access to salary including during pregnancy, a home, 
free healthcare, childcare resources and access to drug rehabilitation centers the specializes in 
working with pregnant persons.  
This thesis will follow three stages to develop an argument for a socialized right to 
reproductive choices. It will start with a summary of the dangers of fetal personhood and the 
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current protections for people with uteruses, followed by an analysis of contemporary feminist 
legal theory on the right to abortion, and the dangers intrinsic to a privatized, neo-liberal right to 
abortion. Finally, I will develop my theory of a socialized right to abortion. 
The Risks of Fetal Personhood 
 
The most prominent and dangerous conservative critique of Roe affirms fetal personhood, 
giving the fetus rights protected by state and federal laws and the constitution. Although fetal 
personhood groups disagree with precisely when fetal rights begin, they usually define life at the 
point of conception. Some argue against birth control and spermicides but most focus on day-
after pills and abortion, others allow for abortion in the case of rape, incest or for the health of 
the mother. At the center of these arguments is that life starts at conception and that fetal life 
should be protected by law. Anti-choice activists have gone to great lengths to not only limit the 
access to abortion through legislation but also through acts of terrorism on health clinics.4 
Legally, the focus has been on affirming fetal personhood to create a constitutionally protected 
personhood status for the fetus. 
If a fetus is given legally protected personhood, it is likely that abortion for any reason, 
except potentially when the life of the pregnant person is threatened, will become illegal. Those 
who provide or receive abortions could also be criminally liable for murder, homicide or 
manslaughter. Although this is concerning, there will likely be a more substantial impact on the 
daily lives of those who are, or may become, pregnant. If a fetus has rights that are protected by 
                                                 
4 Hillcrest Clinic fire in 1983, Christmas Day bombing in 1984, the attempted bombing of 
Alvarado Medical Center in 1987, the Feminist Health Center fire in 1989, the Blue Mountain 
Clinic fire in 1993, the acid attack in Miami in 1998, the fire in Concord New Hampshire in 
2000, the Tacoma, Washington clinic bombing in 2001, the fire at Edgerton Women’s Care 
Center in 2006 as well as many, many others. 
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the constitution, they receive rights separate from the pregnant person who carries the fetus and 
legally exist outside of the body of the pregnant person. The Constitution does offer protection 
for the conditions in which an individual lives their life. Fetal personhood could be used to argue 
for a right to quality of life for the fetus, creating cases for charging the parent with negligence, 
neglect, and potentially even murder in response to the choices made by the pregnant person. 
There will also likely be a resurgence of cases that seek to take over legal custody of the fetus 
from the parent to force medical care and restrictions on the pregnant person.  The effect of fetal 
personhood on individual lives would be up to states. State laws govern murder, homicide, and 
negligence.  
Not all fetal personhood arguments aim to make abortion illegal. Many believe that 
through affirming fetal personhood, the focus of the abortion debate can move to creating a 
stronger pro-abortion argument. A historically popular argument made by Judith Jarvis Thomas 
attempts to make abortion rights possible while affirming fetal personhood. Thomas asks the 
reader if it would be legal for a person to be locked up to life-support to a famous musician for 
nine months if it would save the musicians life. Although the person might choose to support the 
life of the musician, legally, they cannot be forced to, much like a pregnant person cannot be 
forced to carry a fetus. The most common response is that the distinction between the person 
forced to spend their life hooked up to the violinist is that the pregnant person engaged in the 
activity necessary to conceive the zygote/fetus, which ignores discussions over consent.  
Arguments from theorists such as Charles H. Baron state that fetal personhood might 
offer better protection for both the fetus and the pregnant person from infringement on their 
collective rights. In Harman v. Daniels, a mother and their infant child attempted to sue a police 
officer for an alleged injury under the Civil Rights Act. The court ruled that the fetus could not 
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claim recognition under the Civil Rights Act because, as stated in Roe, the fetus did not 
constitute a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Baron presents the hypothetical,  
“[s]uppose a state program paid fees to mothers planning an abortion who agreed to allow 
experimentation on the fetus prior to and after the abortion – but only if the fetus was 
non-white” (Shaw, Doudera, 1983) 
The hypothetical presents a compelling possible benefit to giving some personhood rights to 
fetuses. Baron argues that fetal personhood should be treated similarly to corporate personhood.5 
Fetuses could be given partial personhood but would only receive certain rights that protect the 
fetus without infringing on the rights of the pregnant person. Giving the fetus rights under the 
constitution does not require abortion to be illegal, "a woman who poisons her five-year-old 
child does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment – although she is most likely to have violated 
the homicide laws of her state" (Baron, 1983) and it would provide protection for the fetus both 
in the hypothetical and the actual case above.  
The power to define and regulate abortion returns entirely to the state, returning the 
nation to pre-Roe conditions. People with uteruses could again be forced to travel to other states, 
or countries, to receive abortions, which is impossible in large portions of the United States. 
Even with the current definition of the right to abortion without a right to access, this is slowly 
becoming true. Without the right to have access to reproductive freedom, for most, the right to 
abortion does not exist. It takes too long and is too expensive for many individuals to get a legal, 
let alone illegal, abortion. Even liberal arguments about expanding the right to abortion do not 
take into consideration the necessity of access not only to abortion but to the many services that 
                                                 
5 For other similar arguments, see “The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for the Legal 
Protection of the Unborn” The Law and Politics of Abortion by Patricia King 
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would impact the choice to abort, keep or allow someone else to adopt a fetus genuinely free, 
unburdened socially and economically. This is at the center of a right to reproductive freedom. 
 Baron's solution for state infringement on the right to an abortion is the expansion of self-
defense laws, but the protections offered by self-defense laws are state law. Florida's Stand Your 
Ground law is an excellent example of the differences between the power of self-defense laws 
between states. Baron supports some right to abortion but fails to understand the potential 
consequences to fetal personhood, favoring instead the potential benefits of fetal personhood 
which ignoring the consequences. 
 Fetal personhood offers a unique danger to the rights of pregnant people because it 
provides a potential for marginal reforms by feminists to protect some abortion rights. In the 
ideal world of Baron and Jarvis, personal protection laws would protect the pregnant person from 
severe infringements on individual liberty. Notably, the danger of the affirmation of fetal 
personhood on the national level is that potentially nothing would change at the beginning, and 
both self-defense laws and bodily autonomy protections might be able to win back pieces of 
abortion protections in state or federal courts of law. These protections only exist at the whims of 
the office or court though. At any moment they could be taken away. This is true, in theory, of 
all rights, but in practice, rights such as the right to abortion are substantially more at risk. The 
justification of the focus on individualized protection come from the perception of pregnancy as 
a private experience that exists only in the body of the pregnant person. It makes it difficult to 
argue for greater access to resources and equal conditions as an aspect of reproductive rights. 
Reproductive rights include the ability to decide to engage in sexual activity, the ability to make 
decisions about birth control and access to abortion. 
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Critical Legal Theory Background 
Soon after Roe, feminist and legal theorist began reconstructing its roots and re-arguing 
the case with different interpretations and legal reasoning, attempting to recreate the protections 
missing from Roe. These interpretations largely reject the concept of ‘privacy' as the basis for 
abortion rights and focus on equality, consent, and labor as a basis for political advocacy and 
abortion rights. Although at the time, the privacy doctrine had won significant access to birth 
control and prevailed in the Roe case, many believed that the reliance on the privacy would open 
itself up to slowly dissolving rights because the right to privacy was not explicitly written into 
the Constitution.6 The right to privacy has been heralded both before and after Roe as 
fundamental to personhood and existences, but the right to privacy faces degradation from both 
pro- and anti-abortion advocates. Anti-abortion advocates argue that to get an abortion is not a 
personal decision, whereas, pro-abortion advocates are more worried that because privacy is not 
a realm of political or personal freedom but instead a land of privilege and power dynamics 
being played out to the detriment of less powerful populations. 
Many of these authors reject or re-evaluate the right to privacy but continue to defend, 
either actively or passively, some regulations on the right to abortion. These arguments highlight 
the dangers of restrictions on abortion during viability not as a way to remove any regulations, 
but instead as a response to the increasingly short definition of pre-viability. Many also worry 
about access to abortion through expanding access to clinics but do not take the demands for 
better reproductive choice beyond the right to abortion. 
                                                 
6 Aborting Dignity: The Abortion Doctrine After Gonzales V. Carhart by Victoria Baranetsky 
explores the impact of abortion rights being based on privacy rights, which were created during 
the protection of contract making and other economic rights that were later over-turned.  
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Neo-Liberal Support for Abortion 
The central crux of many abortion arguments is the equity difference that arises as an 
impact of pregnancy. There are not only the physical and mental impacts of pregnancy but the 
economic harm that people with uteruses encounter even without becoming pregnant. For 
theorists worried about equality, two considerations center the arguments: equality of condition 
or equality of result. For those interested in creating equality of condition between those with and 
without uteruses, access to birth control and abortion are critical. Without control over 
reproduction, individuals suffer the impacts of pregnancy without making that choice. Pregnancy 
can lead to substantial economic damages and social shaming even if the child is put up for 
adoption. These effects are worse for the least advantaged populations that suffer from 
discrimination in the medical sphere, a lack of economic resources to provide nutrition and 
environmental stability and have difficulty accessing abortion and birth control due to 
geographic, monetary or social restraints. 
Rachel Roth lays out a history of financial and medical abuses placed on potentially 
pregnant and pregnant people in the name of protecting their potential fetuses. Jobs that involve 
toxic chemicals excluded people with uteruses instead of created methods to protect all 
employees from toxic materials. She also chronicles the abuses layered on pregnant people in the 
name of fetal protection, such as medical decisions that go against the expressed wishes of the 
pregnant person.  
 "All women, therefore, live under the threat that doctors or state agents can wrest away 
control over what happens to their bodies and their lives." (Roth, 91). The potential to enact laws 
that criminalize behavior, or apply laws that already exist to fetuses, forces people with uteruses 
and those who might give abortions to adjust their lifestyle to protect themselves from legal 
repercussions. This is dangerous in two different ways: first, the force of the law acts as a threat 
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without due process; second, by forcing individuals to conform to moralizing beliefs of action 
without the visible force of the law, changes in action are attributed to a cultural shift instead of 
state infringement on individual rights. When the president argues that people who perform or 
receive abortions should face jail time, it creates fear. Then if a law is enacted that would allow 
for the prosecution of these individuals, whether or not the law is carried out, the reduction of 
abortions would reflect the number of reductions in who will perform abortions along with those 
who will get abortions from fear of prosecution. 
A neo-liberal justification for abortion rights does not deny the underlying tenants of Roe. 
It makes an argument that the right to an abortion should exist because the denial of such a right 
will seriously compromise a person with a uterus’s ability to interact in the economic sphere. The 
equality argument does not address the conflict between economic and private rights, nor ways 
to address the effects of inequality between people with uteruses and ignores the rampant abuses 
within the private sphere.  
Radical Feminist Support for Abortion 
 
For some, the concept of a private sphere that the government should not infringe upon 
forces them into a prison of abuse, rape, and mistreatment that is normalized by the patriarchal 
understanding of power dynamics and the family structure. These structures leave room for 
marital rape, emotional and physical abuse. Catharine MacKinnon is concerned with these 
conditions of abuse that permeate the ‘private' sphere in cases of blatant abuse and where the 
societal expectations lead women into situations that they did not and cannot consent.7 The 
                                                 
7 MacKinnon is frequently criticized by queer theorists for her exclusion of non-cisgendered 
heteronormative people in her writing. Although MacKinnon tends to essentialize the conditions 
of some women to the conditions of all people with uteruses, her writing is still useful in 
understanding the ways in which language of consent has been destroyed through the abuses of 
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conditions leading up to pregnancy and abortion are particularly crucial to MacKinnon, the 
assumption of consent in conditions in which rape or coercion cannot be proven, like in the case 
of marital rape, make it impossible to regulate abortion based on ‘consent' to sex that leads to 
pregnancy. Further, even if the sex was ‘consensual' that does not require genuine consent 
because the conditions leading up to and involved in the act of sex are predetermined by the 
societal conditions that affect decisions made by people with uteruses. The language of consent 
is functionally bankrupt in common language because it is impossible to consent in a society that 
has been pre-determining one's answers since birth. 
“In private, consent tends to be presumed. It is true that showing of coercion voids this 
presumption. But the problem is getting anything private to be perceived as coercive… 
The private is the public for those whom the personal is political… Roe vs Wade 
presumes that the government nonintervention into the private sphere promotes a 
woman’s freedom of choice… So women got abortion as a private privilege, not as a 
public right” (MacKinnon, 100). 
Marital rape was not a crime in all 50 states until 1993, this type of rape is incredibly difficult to 
argue in court, consent to sexual acts is often presumed from clothing choices, attending events, 
consuming alcohol, comments made to friends, and previous consent. To many, marriage is 
consent to sex for the rest of married life. Some claim headaches, fatigue, and illness to escape 
sex with their partners that will not, or may not, accept that their partner wishes not to have sex. 
There is no protection inside the home so long as there is no violence reported, and even when 
individuals report violence, many are still left unprotected in the name of privacy. These laws 
only seek to entrench the violence further making consensual choices impossible. 
                                                 
the patriarchy. Patricia Cain offers a critique of MacKinnon’s centering of non-queer experiences 
in their piece “Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories”.  
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 The necessity to center the discussion of sex and the private sphere is similar to the 
necessity of centering work and the economic sphere to Marxists. MacKinnon laments the 
conditions of sex saying, “Sex is to Feminists what Work is to Marxists.” By relegating 
discussions about the poor treatment of people with uteruses into the private sphere, the 
prerogative is forced into the hands of the abused to protect themselves. The private sphere hides 
the amount of abuse and coercion that exists in the lives and relationships of people with 
uteruses.  
 MacKinnon worries though that access to abortion in the private sphere only further 
forces heterosexuality and sexual accessibility on women. To have the right to abortion lowers 
the perceived consequences of sexual violence to those who enact that violence, even more so it 
opens up more bodies to their violence. MacKinnon doesn’t argue that abortion should be illegal, 
MacKinnon sees abortion as a necessary right for people with uteruses, but this right arrives not 
from the conditions of pregnancy themselves, but instead from the conditions before pregnancy 
that lead to it. The societal conditions that lead sex to be non-consensual create the necessity of 
abortion, even if that choice is affected by coercion. So long as only women with privilege have 
the ability to receive abortions, that there is no true right to abortion, only a privilege.8   
Marxist Analysis: Pregnancy as Labor 
 The problem of privilege in deciding who gets to receive reproductive care, including 
abortions, is particularly applicable Marxist theory once pregnancy and giving birth are 
understood as labor. Texts such as “Wages Against House Work” have created a framework in 
                                                 
8 In MacKinnon critiques the availability of abortions to only to those who have access to the 
doctor and the financial resources to abortion as exclusionary to large portions of the population, 
meaning that there is no right to abortion. “The existing distribution of power and resources 
within the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy exists to protect.” 
(MacKinnon, 101). There is not a true right to abortion until it is protected as a right outside of 
privacy and it is covered and accessible to all people if the choose to receive one.  
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which to see the unpaid labor that occurs inside the household, or in this case inside the body of 
the pregnant person as economically important labor.9 The type of labor that occurs in the 
household is generally called reproductive labor because of its importance in keeping the laborer 
able to return to work. The language used to discuss pregnancy and birth mirrors the language 
that Marxists use. People with uteruses produce the next generation of workers, filling the 
factory floor. Much like in “Wages Against Housework,” the person with a uterus provides life-
giving care, such as feeding and providing shelter for, the fetus. Federici demands access to 
wages for housework as a way to then enable homeworkers to reject the position put upon 
women and to unionize for better working conditions and fair wage. The analysis of a non-
traditional understanding of work allows for the historical labor of women as homemakers, 
caretakers, and child-birthers to have a greater prevalence. 
Although this framework is not generally accepted in public discourse, it does allow for 
interesting Marxists legal interpretations. Rubenfeld’s legal analysis sits on the back of work 
from second wave feminist Marxists but does not go nearly as far. Jed Rubenfeld describes 
pregnancy as “a specific, long term, life occupying course of conduct,” and he uses this analysis 
of pregnancy to compare Bailey v. Alabama (1911) to the conditions faced by pregnant people 
when abortion is illegal. Under Rubenfeld’s framework, forced pregnancy is indentured 
servitude in which the pregnant person is forced to raise the child, at their own expense and 
without, necessarily, their consent to the work. 
When pregnant people lack the option to have an abortion, they forced into labor by the 
government. If pregnancy constitutes labor under the criteria that Rubenfeld gives, then the right 
to abortion through Bailey (1911) that decided indentured servitude was unconstitutional. A right 
                                                 
9 Sylvia Federici “Wages Against Housework” 
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to abortion under Rubenfeld’s analysis is an economic right, a right that ensures that an 
individual has a right to choose their own profession. The right to choose one’s own profession 
guarantees the government does not determine the options available to pursue economic activity. 
If Rubenfeld is able to frame pregnancy as a profession, then it also creates avenues for pregnant 
people to argue for better, fairer, working conditions through the multitude of worker’s rights 
cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court. 
 Rubenfeld expands his analysis into a weighing system for arguments about the rights of 
fetuses and the moral arguments against abortion. He addresses these in a few separate ways; 
primarily he focuses on the evolution of fetuses in the womb from a zygote to a fetus to a child 
through the gestation period, then he critiques claims that the State has the ability to make a 
moral judgment on when life begins.  
“The judgement is a moral one, and, generally speaking, states are free to arrive at their 
own conclusion on moral matters… but a state’s prerogative to legislate morality is not 
unlimited. The prerogative ends when legislated morality would deprive an individual of 
a constitutional right.” (Balkin, 115) 
After defending the right to abortion as protected through the constitution from the Bailey case, 
he must respond to the argument that a State can regulate abortion due to their moral beliefs in 
when life begins. Even without a consensus agreement between doctors, philosophers or clergy 
about the moment in which life begins, each state has the ability to make decisions about what 
constitutes life and how this will interplay with their laws, this is not true when the law infringes 
on rights, like the right to abortion, established by the Bailey case. States such as Texas have 
made it state policy that life beings at conception, but this has no legal effect on abortion rights at 
the current time.  
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Criticizing the State’s Interest in Potential Life 
 
 If life begins at conception, Texas, and many other heartbeat states, fail to protect both 
the carriers of that life and the potential life itself from the most basic harms. Poverty, 
malnutrition, unsafe working conditions, and abusive households all directly risk the lives of 
individuals both already born and fetal. A state that claims to be concerned with the conditions of 
life of a fetus should, in theory, be at least equally as concerned with the lives of those who have 
already been born. The interest of the state to bring life into the world seems to be 
inappropriately applied, and generally unnecessary in legal terms. 
 Within an analysis of the actual conditions of abortion procedures and in place legal 
restrictions it becomes clear that states already have a robust ability to regulate the medical 
profession and provide support to individuals to decrease the numbers of abortion necessary. 
Instead, the focus on restricting abortions ignores the causes of abortions: lack of resources, birth 
defects due to environmental harms, lack of access to birth control, rape and assault, large 
number of children up for adoption, coercion, economic disadvantages to pregnancy and 
childbirth, and lack of sex education to name a few. These problems could be solved and 
addressed by states, dramatically reducing the number of both socially and medically necessary 
abortions. Instead, the focus on protecting potential life is through infringing on the rights of 
people with uteruses.  
For the Health of the Mother 
 
There are many other ways for the state to protect the health of the pregnant person 
throughout the abortion procedure without infringing on individuals rights. The right of the state 
to regulate the medical profession is clear. There must be oversight on doctors, nurses and 
hospitals to ensure that they refrain from malpractice and abuse of patients, especially when 
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those patients cannot advocate for themselves. Oversight is generally managed by the Federal 
Drug Administration, legislation passed on the conditions of hospitals and clinics, and guidelines 
for medical professions. These rules and regulations apply to all medical treatment and 
consideration. Additionally, doctors sign an oath not to endanger the lives of patients either 
through a lack of service or through the administration of risky or life-threatening procedures 
unless in the case of an emergency or if the risk/outcome without the procedure or medication is 
worse than the risk undertaken through medical intervention. Consent is also mandatory 
throughout the treatment, if the patient decides, while in a sound state of mind to not undergo 
treatment, even if that decision might risk the life of the individual, they are allowed to withdraw 
from treatment or request a different course of action. Furthermore, decisions that risk the safety 
of an individual in favor of assisting another, such as a kidney transplant, exist if both parties 
consent to the treatment. No individual can be forced into medical treatment against their own 
will in cases where their decision endangers their own life, or in the case of a potential kidney 
transplant or even blood donation or the life of another. These central tenants of medical care are 
the basis for Judith Jarvis Thompson’s Violist argument. 
The health of the mother was used by states in the past to limit the right to abortion.  It 
was considered a medical intervention because of its associated high mortality rate. It is still used 
as one of the compelling state interests in Roe. The question then remains, is the procedure still 
dangerous enough that there needs to be a unique intervention on behalf of the patient because 
the danger is too great? Medically, the several abortion procedures, throughout the trimesters, 
have become much safer. In the first several weeks, a prescription can be written, and pills can 
be taken at home to cause a chemical abortion, later medical procedures are often preformed in 
clinics and outpatient facilities.  
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Abortions that require invasive medical procedures are last choice options, these do 
increase the risk to an individual, and state regulation of these abortion procedures makes sense, 
this regulation easily fits under the current regulatory standards. For the majority of people with 
uteruses, abortion is sought as soon as possible Only about 1.3% of abortions are in the third 
trimester.10 For that 1.3%, the choice to get an abortion is likely because of physical or mental 
danger to the pregnant person or the fetus. There is also the potential that this person either 
lacked the knowledge that they were pregnant or were unable to utilize abortion resources earlier 
because of abuse or family intrusion into the decision. For those whose physical or mental health 
is at stake, the right to an abortion is currently legal. The procedure is used to mitigate the danger 
to the pregnant person, much like other potentially dangerous medical procedures. For those who 
have faced abuse, intrusion into the decision or did not know they were pregnant, the decision to 
choose to get an abortion can be made like all other medical decisions, through an examination 
of the risk involved. Doctors will not agree to perform a procedure that unnecessarily risks the 
health of life or the patient. It would be against their oath and open the doctor up to medical 
malpractice lawsuits. The pregnant person will also not attempt a risky procedure unless there is 
no better option. The current protections under law provide a more than sufficient framework to 
reduce the risk to the health of the pregnant person. The state’s compelling interest in the ‘health 
of the mother’ would have to be shown to be unique in some way over the current medical 
considerations, outside of an argument for the protection of the fetus or moral concerns about the 
rational decision-making ability of pregnant persons. 
The decisions made in the name of medical good conduct should not differ in the case of 
abortion than in the case of other medical procedures. If a doctor decides that the abortion is of 
                                                 
10 Center for Disease Control and Prevention  
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reasonable safety, in comparison to the condition of the pregnant person and the risks of 
childbirth, then they should be allowed to continue with the abortion. The opinion of another 
doctor, or two, should not be necessary, much like in other medical decisions. A second opinion 
can be a valuable tool both to doctors and patients, but the patient decides to allow for the 
sharing of their medical records or concerns with each doctor that they consent to treat them. 
Furthermore, if the doctor sees no reason to request a second opinion, and the patient does not 
desire one, there is no reason for the state to demand a second opinion. The state could require a 
second opinion for doctors for specific types of medical decisions, but they would have to make 
clear what makes these procedures uniquely require the opinion of more than one doctor. The 
procedures that are associated with abortion are less dangerous than many other common 
procedures provided in hospitals and outpatient clinics. In the past, the state has never seen it 
necessary to have more than one opinion about a procedure, but those involved could seek a 
second opinion. This follows with a state’s demand for specific information to be shared with the 
person seeking an abortion that is outside of the demands of medical due-diligence. If the sharing 
of information is necessary to make an informed opinion about the medical procedure, then it 
already must be given to the patient.  
The medical dangers of pregnancy are not purely in the abortion. Both the time spent 
being pregnant and giving birth are dangerous and draining processes. Without access to 
resources that protect the health of both the mother and fetus, there can be major health impacts 
to one or both parties. This can lead to miscarriages, short lifespans of the fetus, and the death of 
the pregnant person. Medical, environmental and social harms all increase the likelihood that the 
fetus or the pregnant person will face complications. These threats to ‘potential life’ and the life 
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of the pregnant person are consistently ignored, in favor of curtailing the pregnant person’s right 
to bodily autonomy.  
Abuses Allowed in the State’s Interest in Potential Right 
 
 In Rachel Roth’s book Making Women Pay, they underline how even potential pregnancy 
was used to curtail the rights of people with uteruses in economic, social and medical spheres. 
Those who may become pregnant were forced out of jobs that could cause congenital disabilities 
and were forced into medical treatments that they objected to in favor of the ‘fetal interests. Fetal 
personhood gives “the fetus and independent relationship with the state that bypasses the 
pregnant women” (Roth, 3). When the pregnant person becomes at odds with the fetus that they 
are supporting, a doctor for the fetus can impose regulations and restrictions on the pregnant 
person, and a lawyer for the fetus even has the potential to sue the pregnant person on behalf of 
the fetus. The requirements that are now placed on pregnant people not only give the fetus a right 
to life, but a right to a specific quality of life, Margery Shaw advocated for requiring pregnant 
people to go through currently optional genetic testing and follow through with ablest and 
eugenic policies that require the pregnant person to undergo medical intrusions into their 
pregnancy despite the beliefs or wishes of the pregnant person lest they be sued on behalf of the 
fetus if the fetus is then born with a preventable condition. before Roe fetal rights could be used 
to justify even life-threatening procedures against the wishes of the pregnant person. One 
example is the Mollholland 1987 case, that Roth cites, where a pregnant person who had 
terminal cancer instructed their doctors to attempt to resuscitate them before trying to say the 
fetus if they went into cardiac arrest. Although the state ruled in favor of the pregnant person 
finally, there were several doctors and state officials that were willing to force the pregnant 
person into a life-threatening procedure against their wishes to retrieve a 6-month developed 
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fetus.11 The dangers to the lives of people with uteruses are not only at the points in their lives in 
which they are pregnant but begin from birth and continue until they are no longer able to 
reproduce. 
 A current infringement in the rights of pregnant people even without abortion restrictions 
are the ongoing attacks on pregnant people who use drugs during their pregnancy. Even though 
most rehabilitation facilities do not accept pregnant people, due to the different treatments needs 
to assist in the recovery in pregnant people, many courts prosecute pregnant drug addicts with 
child abuse and negligence. (Schroedel, 2000) In the past, nurses and doctors would test the 
blood of pregnant people and their newly born children to test for drugs and used these, now 
illegal, blood tests to prosecute the parent with child abuse. With an expansion of fetal rights, 
blood tests like these could become legal again, and they could be expanded to legal activities, 
limiting people with uteruses ability to drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes, which is legal but 
could harm fetal development. It can take weeks to discover a pregnancy, so the rights of people 
with uteruses to consume alcohol, medication, illegal drugs, or smoke would be significantly 
curtailed in favor of the ‘potential right to life.’ Many commonplace medications are dangerous 
to fetal development but are necessary or useful in treating illness, which could place normal, 
everyday access to the standard of care for certain illnesses or diseases at risk in favor of the 
health of a potential fetus.  
Socializing the Interest in ‘Potential Human Life’: Reproductive Freedom 
 
If arguments for fetal personhood, with legally recognized personhood at conception, are 
won in court is it likely to be the end of abortion rights as a whole. At the present moment, the 
                                                 
11 This fetus would be very premature and likely not survive outside of the womb at 6-months.  
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court has refused to decide if ‘personhood’ starts at conception or afterwards, in favor of defining 
an ‘interest’ in potential life, that becomes compelling at the point of viability. The court rejects 
the theory of fetal personhood in Roe.  
“the word ‘person’, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn… 
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, 
a fetus… [I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time 
another interest, that of health of the mother or of the potential human life, becomes 
significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy 
she possesses must be measured accordingly.” (Blackmun, 159) 
Instead of supporting fetal personhood the court opts for the language of ‘potential human life’. 
The court may not give all rights held by the pregnant person over to the fetus, but if Roe’s 
analysis on a compelling interested in potential life appears in front of a conservative court, it 
opens itself up to easy criticism and dismissal based on the contradictions on the rights of fetuses 
in Justice Blackmun’s decision. For the fetus to have the ability to infringe on the rights of the 
pregnant person, it must have a claim to a right or principle that can be used to weigh against the 
rights of the pregnant person or another involved party. Robert Alexy presents a theory of 
constitutional rights that takes into consideration the balancing required to optimize each 
individual’s right. Using Alexy’s framework for constitutional right optimization, the right to 
bodily autonomy would be both a principle and a rule, a person’s right to an abortion would 
function as a principle. “A principle can be overridden when the counter principle has more force 
in the instant case.” (Möller, 2007) For the ‘potential life’ to override the right to abortion, it 
would have to carry more force.12 Reproductive freedom and access to abortion is a critical 
aspect of bodily autonomy for anyone who has the ability to become pregnant.  
                                                 
12 Alexy gives three main conditions to reach an optimal balance between the two principles: 
suitability, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense. Suitability means that the limiting 
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A Right to Reproductive Freedom 
 
To redefine and understand a right to reproductive freedom, it is necessary to rethink the 
relationship between the pregnant person and the fetus as not in conflict. Instead, the fetus is a 
part of the pregnant person, their interests are the same, even if that interest is not to keep the 
fetus. Medically, the fetus cannot have an opinion, and the pregnant person speaks for the best 
interests of their body, which the fetus is a part of. The needs of the fetus are directly dependent 
on the needs of the pregnant person. Care and protection for the fetus is dependent on the 
decisions and resources of the pregnant person.  
 The ‘compelling interest’ in potential life is only applied in contexts that remove rights 
from people with uteruses, creating conflict between the fetus and the pregnant person. The state 
only has an interest in ‘potential life’ when the protection of that life requires nothing from the 
government. There is almost no governmental support for pregnant people. Many pro-abortion 
activists focus on the burdens of parenthood that is placed primarily on the person who was 
pregnant, generally women. This burden includes providing for nearly 24-hour care for the infant 
for the first several months followed by 16+ hour care after the first few months, which often 
requires the caretaker to take off work, damages promotion opportunities and is seen by 
employers as a reason to not hire or promote the potential caretaker. There is also a financial 
burden to support this child for 18 years, with little more than a tax break for the expenses. 
Social judgements are also placed on parents, specifically the parent that birthed the child, such 
as their quality of parenting and the resources and time they can spend with the child.   
                                                 
of one principle must help to advance the other. Necessity requires the least intrusion into the 
principle that is being limited. Proportionality means that each right must be weight for their 
importance in the specific case. (summarized from Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional 
Rights, Kai Möller) 
Henry 27 
 
 
 
 
Benefits to a Socialized Right to Reproductive Freedom 
 
If the state truly believed in a compelling interest in potential life there would be 
substantially more resources to support pregnant people, as well as protection from the 
environmental and socioeconomic conditions that could negatively impact the fetus for pregnant 
people that want to give birth. The increasingly dramatic effects of climate change put pregnant 
people, fetuses and young children at the greatest risk of damage due to “lack of food and safe 
drinking water, poor sanitation, population migration, changing disease patterns and morbidity, 
more frequent extreme weather events, and lack of shelter.” (Rylander). These conditions affect 
low- and middle-income women with the greatest prevalence, for the state to give their claim 
legitimacy, they must start with an effort to minimize the effects of climate change and pollutants 
on pregnant people, which cause adverse health impacts that the pregnant person has no control 
over.13 The State should offer greater prenatal care, medical resources both during and before 
pregnancy, and after-birth financial support.   
In Alexy’s study of balancing rights, to infringe on a principle, it must be a necessity to 
infringe on an individual’s rights. It would be possible for the State to mitigate the dangers to 
potential life to the same degree that allowing infringement on the rights of people with uteruses 
by intervening in any of these issues.14 These protections need to exist for people with either 
                                                 
13 The effects of pollution on fetuses is even greater than the impact of climate change, to impose 
restrictions on corporations, who’s polluting activities can in no way be construed as a 
constitutional right, would be a necessary start in proving a State’s interest in protecting fetal 
rights. 
14 Several of the interventions above would increase the quality of life of potential life that is 
wanted, they would also decrease the chance of birth defects, stillborn or miscarriages. Providing 
more monetary support for pregnant people and for parents who raise children would make it 
substantially easier to keep and raise children in all stages of pregnancy.  
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reproductive organ, as the impacts of chemicals that can affect the viability of eggs in a uterus 
can also affect the sperm causing congenital disabilities in the fetus or forcing sterility. These are 
all concerns that should be faced and considered by a State before they claim that their 
compelling interest in potential life is strong enough to over-rule an individual’s constitutional 
rights.15 There is no legal imperative for the government to intervene on behalf of fetuses, but if 
they choose to do so, the intervention should occur without infringement on the rights of one 
group. 
These rights do not stem purely out of a State’s interest in protecting fetal rights, but 
instead should be framed as one piece of the right to choose to conceive a child or not. In making 
that choice, there should be the assumption that the State will protect the choice to conceive the 
child. It is in the State’s interest to protect the rights of its citizens both to have healthy children, 
through protections of conditions before, during and after pregnancy, along with their rights to 
participate fully in economic and political spheres. It is a current failing of the government that it 
does not ensure a right to even small amounts of social inclusion. This is a failure both in the 
government’s role to protect the people, and also creates an inefficient society. Robin West 
argues that the pregnant person, and then later the primary care parent, are excluded from the 
benefits of citizenship. The work that is required to be pregnant, and then to be the primary 
                                                 
15 That Roe did not make further effort to clarify where the State’s compelling interest in 
protecting fetal life comes from and how that is consistent in the laws supported by the State 
outside of just access to abortion was, in my opinion, a major misstep in the case. This 
contradiction was mentioned in the footnotes of the decision by Blackmun where he calls out the 
contradiction in the Texas penal code “if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life 
without due process of law, and if the mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not the 
Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s command? ... the penalty for 
criminal abortion specified by Art. 1195 is significantly less than the maximum penalty for 
murder prescribed by Art. 1257” although Blackmun uses this contradiction to question the claim 
for fetal personhood not the state’s interest in protecting potential life. The same method should 
be used to question the existence of a compelling interest.  
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caregiver for a child for the first several years, let alone the 18 required of a parent, makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the parent or pregnant person to use their citizenship.  
“But if it is true that citizenship is inconsistent with motherhood, and if it is also true that 
it is indeed unconstitutional to arrange society so that citizens by definition are not 
mothers and mothers by definition are not citizens, then it is an undertaking that Congress 
should commence pronto, no matter how arduous the task might prove to be” (West, 
145)16 
There is also a compelling interest that the state has in protecting fetal health, pregnant people’s 
health, and the general health of the population. To understand an interest in the economic, 
medical and social well-being of those in society who may become pregnant in the context of a 
protection of future generations allows for the understanding that there needs to be a burden 
placed on the State to regulate pollution, to reverse climate change, to protect those most 
vulnerable from attack, but that does not privilege the fetus above the pregnant person, nor give 
the fetus rights outside of the right of the pregnant person. A pregnant person should have the 
right to give birth to a healthy child if they so desire, they do not have an obligation to give birth, 
or to have medical testing, or to receive medical treatment that might ensure a healthy child, but 
if they wish to have any of those things or many more, they have a right to that.  
Conclusion 
 After reviewing and examining the current arguments both for and against abortion 
rights, there seems to be no reason to limit a pregnant person’s ability to receive an abortion. The 
arguments for fetal personhood, both the pro- and anti-abortion arguments, rely on an argument 
centered around morality claims, that life begins at conception and must be protected. Although 
fetal personhood, pro-abortion arguments tend to limit the reach of fetal personhood rights, they 
                                                 
16 Balkin, Jack M., Siegel, Reva B. (2009) The Constitution in 2020. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
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still allow for the rights of the fetus to be equal to the rights of the pregnant person in specific 
cases. The critical legal theory arguments presented in this paper, social equality, radical feminist 
consent, and Marxist labor analysis, all create the basis for my argument for a socialized right to 
abortion. This right would allow for the decrease in abortions without having to infringe on the 
right to bodily autonomy of people with uteruses.  
 The socialized right to reproductive freedom understands and treats the causes of 
abortion. To limit the ability for individuals to receive abortions would just recreate the black 
market of medical care that existed pre-Roe where groups like Jane trained individuals to 
perform abortions in their home and doctors exploited desperate persons to pay large sums of 
cash for dangerous procedures that often lead to sterilization and long-term medical problems. A 
socialized right to reproductive freedom offers housing for families, free medical care both 
before and after pregnancy, food for the pregnant person and their family, sex education starting 
at an early age that does not shame people who choose to be sexually active, attempting to 
mitigate the effects of pollution and climate change on all peoples, and understanding people 
with uteruses as capable of making their own decisions. An attempt to quell the desire for 
abortion without addressing what creates the need for abortion is an act of futility, abortion 
access will always be a necessity, but the need can be lowered by adopting a socialized right to 
reproductive freedom.   
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